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Transactions of the American Philological Association 136 (2006) 99–131

The Meaning and Function of *Phantasia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III.1*

JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ
University of Oregon

SUMMARY: In *Rhetoric* III.1 Aristotle characterizes *lexis* thus: ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν. Modern scholars have glossed *phantasia* here as "mere show," concluding that *lexis* is "superficial ostentation" intended merely to appeal to a corrupt audience. I argue instead that in this passage, as elsewhere in Aristotle, *phantasia* stands for the psychological function that mediates between sense perception and man's higher intellectual faculties. By invoking *phantasia*, Aristotle instructs us to view *lexis* against the background of his psychology, as mediating the rhetorical task and entrusted with turning the orator's subject matter into such *phantasmata* as will successfully shape the opinion of the listeners and gain their *pistis*.

ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC* HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED MUCH ATTENTION, especially the philosopher's treatment of enthymematic proof and of human emotions. Despite significant exchange and dialogue, numerous disagreements remain and a consensus has failed to develop. Not so with the sole occurrence of φαντασία in the third book of the *Rhetoric* (1404a11), which translators and commentators alike join in glossing as "ostentation," "outward show," "mere appearance," *vel sim.*[1] This near unanimous agreement has led one writer to

* I wish to thank Professor Gisela Striker for her comments on an early version of this paper; and the anonymous readers for their helpful suggestions.

[1] Baldwin 1924: 23 is one of a handful of exceptions. He translates 1404a11–12, "all these things [i.e., of diction and delivery] being means of suggesting images and gauged to the hearer" (and is approved by Meijering 1987: 22). Labarrière (1994) is the other notable dissenter. He is more interested, however, in exploring the corresponding limitations on the orator and his task (especially in connection with *Rh.* III.12) than in justifying his understanding of *phantasia* in *Rh.* III.1.6: "la *phantasia* de la *Rhetorique* 3.1.6, 04a11 ne saurait s'entendre comme 'la présentation mentale, une simple copie, sans realité.' Bien au contraire, la *phantasia* ici en question renvoie à ce en fonction de quoi quelque chose *apparaît* à X ou Y *comme* ceci ou cela" (238, his emphasis).

assert that "I cannot find a modern translation that takes the word *phantasia* seriously."[2] And yet, this was not always so. For many Renaissance scholars insisted on reading the *Rhetoric* against the background of Aristotle's psychology, and articulated the relationship between *mens* (νοῦς) and *animus* (θυμός) on the fulcrum of *phantasia*,[3] focusing on the role played by *elocutio* (λέξις) in the acquisition of knowledge.[4] It is fair, I think, to say that they allowed the concept its full psychological import. By "psychological" I mean a view of *phantasia* as a faculty of the human *psykhê*, rather than the "popular" or colloquial register invoked by those who render it "mere show." Fortenbaugh, who seems to support the consensus view,[5] calls *phantasia* in its connection with the soul "[a] biological faculty" (2002: 96) and assigns it to Aristotle's "biological psychology" (100). But to argue successfully against a psychological reading of *phantasia* in the *Rhetoric*, it is not enough, as he and others do, to maintain that it is the equivalent of φαίνεσθαι, which admittedly is common to indicate what appears to be the case, without "any particular psychological framework" (*ibid.* 97 n. 1); one would also have to show that it occurs in contexts that have no epistemological implications, that it is not concerned with an analysis of man's apprehension of his world and circumstances, that it does not draw attention to perceptive and cognitive processes.[6]

[2] Green 2000: 158. By "serious" this author means *phantasia* in its "psychological" sense, as explained next.

[3] Robortello 1548: 28–29 even based his understanding of the mimetic nature of man on the peculiar quality of his *phantasia*.

[4] Using *phantasia* to explain the psychology of *elocutio*, they concentrated on *species*, the "impressions" on the "sensitive soul," processed into *phantasmata* and passed on to the intellective faculty. So, e.g., Vettori (1579) *ad* 1404a10–11: "huiuscemodi omnia, si vere quaeras, non ad docendum faciunt, sed ad *speciem* assumuntur, et ad auditorem ipsum referuntur, qui non ita in aliis, ut in dicendi arte respicitur. φαντασία ἔστιν, valet non suapte natura vim habent, sed ex opinionibus hominum penduntur." The same emphasis on psychology is present in Barbaro and Barbaro 1544: 146, and in Riccobono 1588 whenever he talks about *ante oculos ponere* (e.g. p. 318). For a study of Renaissance *elocutio* in relation to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* see Green 2000; and for Renaissance conceptions of the soul as they relate to *phantasia* and the *Rhetoric* see Green 1998, esp. 294–95.

[5] Though I do not know of a place in his writings where he translates the *phantasia* of *Rh.* III.1, his views in Fortenbaugh 1986 and 2002 lead me to believe that he would be in agreement with the tenor of the common gloss. He makes clear, at any rate, that nothing more than a colloquial register of the word is involved in Aristotle's treatment of human emotions in *Rh.* II.

[6] Aristotle's use of φανῆναι at 1403b17 is hardly accidental. Here he is concerned with the manner in which one ought to speak (ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, 1403b16–17), for this "contributes much to the speech appearing to be of a certain character" (συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον, 1403b17–18). That φαίνεσθαι

Here I would like to argue precisely for such a psychological reading of *phantasia* in *Rhetoric* III.1, the chapter in which Aristotle sets the stage for his sustained treatment of *lexis* (chapters 2–12). My strategy will be to show that there are valid reasons to set aside the dominant consensus, and that, once we do so, the best remaining alternative is to assume that in *Rhetoric* III.1, as elsewhere, Aristotle has the psychological meaning in view. As I lay my case before the reader, my argument will proceed through the following stages: first, I will summarize the apparent reasons for the current consensus; then, I will present the evidence in favor of a psychological reading of *phantasia*; a short overview of Aristotle's use of this word in his larger *oeuvre* will follow; and I will close with the contribution that a redefined *phantasia*, with its full psychological dimensions, makes to our understanding of the rhetorical task.

THE MODERN CONSENSUS AND ITS RATIONALE

Since the views scholars hold about *phantasia* in *Rhetoric* III.1 depend partly on how they construe the relationship between *lexis* and *hypokrisis*, it is here that we must start our analysis of the modern consensus and its rationale. Many believe the Aristotle marginalizes *hypokrisis* as morally objectionable in favor of a view of *lexis* that precludes it, associating *phantasia* closely and exclusively with the undesirable *hypokrisis*. This suggests that *phantasia* must be something that should itself be censured, "mere show" or "ostentatiousness." But I believe that Aristotle never entirely sidelines *hypokrisis*, and that if *hypokrisis* is vulnerable to abuse, so also is *lexis* and even rhetoric as a whole. Thus *phantasia* is not simply the outcome or instrument of self-interested manipulation, but belongs with the processes of perception and cognition:

should occur precisely where he addresses the orator's need (ἀνάγκη) to shape his speech in a way that will make its character *appear* suggests that the psychology of perception is in view and that, consequently, a psychological reading of *lexis* is called for (cf. Halliwell 1993: 54 and 60). I can well enough adopt Labarrière's formulation (see above, n. 1) that *phantasia* "sends us back to that by which something *appears* to X or Y *as* this or that." But I think Nussbaum 1996: 307 does not fully take Aristotle's meaning when, in her effort to prevent 'fear' from being construed without "belief," she writes that in *Rh.* II.5 "no technical distinction between *phantasia* and believing is at issue…. *phantasia* is used…simply as the verbal noun of *phainesthai*, 'appear'"; and she adds: "[*Rh.* II] shows no awareness of the more technical psychological distinctions of *De Anima*" (*ibid.* 321 n. 16). And yet to sustain her understanding of "fear" one need not deny that psychological *phantasia* is in view. Indeed, the goal of rhetorical practice is *phantasia* with *pistis*, but *pistis* cannot exist without *doxa* (see below, pp. 116 and 125). Thus, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle elides the possibility of *phantasia* without *doxa*, and this sufficiently accounts for what seems superficially like emotion without belief.

though it may be abused by the unprincipled, it is a necessary part of human discourse. Our first goal, then, is to understand the conceptual outlines of *hypokrisis* and *lexis*, so as to appreciate better the nature and role of *phantasia*, which, the philosopher says, is what all these things amount to (ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστί, 1404a11).

In *Rhetoric* III.1 Aristotle moves from his extended treatment of *pisteis* (the focus of books one and two) to *lexis*, the second member of his tripartite division in the study of rhetoric. Very soon in the course of this chapter, however, *hypokrisis* takes center stage, and its specific relationship to *lexis*—the avowed topic under consideration—has long remained in contention. *Rhetoric* 1403b18–22 marks the transition to the new subject: "The first thing to be examined was naturally that which comes first by nature, whence the facts themselves get their persuasiveness; second is how to compose this in language [*lexis*]; and third is something that has the greatest force, but has not yet been taken in hand, the matter of delivery [*hypokrisis*]."[7] The two respective terms that follow under "second" and "third," *lexis* and *hypokrisis* (usually translated "style" and "oral delivery"),[8] are, for some, distinct and coordinate ones, while others, disagreeing, make oral delivery subordinate to style in Aristotle's schema. Both groups, however, agree in this regard: that the philosopher introduces oral delivery as a temporary parenthesis, which he then closes as he moves on to the treatment of style strictly considered, only to reopen it in chapter 12 (at the end of the section), before he takes up the matter of "arrangement." In my opinion *hypokrisis is* a subordinate division of *lexis* (Aristotle has already made clear his intention to speak next about this very subject, 1403b14–15), but it is not a parenthesis; rather, all throughout his discussion of style the philosopher remains concerned with delivery.[9]

[7] Kennedy's 1991 translation [henceforth simply "Kennedy"] ad loc., modified. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τούτων ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὔπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν.

[8] The Latin equivalents are *elocutio* for *lexis* and *actio* for *hypokrisis*, whose mutual relationship, I believe, Aristotle conceives of in terms quite different from those established by the later masters of Latin rhetoric.

[9] Though relevant, fully arguing this point would exceed the scope of this article and must be left to a future work. I do so here briefly. The key is to realize that when Aristotle mentions *phantasia*, he is not simply talking about *hypokrisis* but more broadly about "the subject of expression" (τὸ τῆς λέξεως); and that several times in the course of *Rh.* III.2–11 he returns explicitly to the voice and its attributes as well as to the impact style has on the expression of *êthos* and *pathos*—the very matters embraced by *hypokrisis* (cf. 1403b27–28). Now, if indeed Aristotle does not sideline delivery as morally objectionable, it should be clear that "mere show" as the meaning of *phantasia*—the heart of this negative view of delivery—is less plausible.

Aristotle does not attempt a formal definition of *hypokrisis*, assuming, perhaps, that its connection with the theater (τραγική, 1403b22) suffices to explain it. He soon adds that "it [*hypokrisis*] lies in the voice (ἐν τῇ φωνῇ), how one should use it to express each emotion" (1403b27–28). The inventory that follows pertains in its entirety to the management of the voice and, generally, to oral delivery: its "loudness," whether μεγάλη, μικρά, or μέση; its "intonation" or "pitch" (τόνος): ὀξύς, βαρύς, or μέσος; and the "rhythms" (ῥυθμοί) that correspond to each case. He then gathers these under the headings μέγεθος, ἁρμονία, and ῥυθμός.[10] Central to Aristotle's understanding of *hypokrisis*—its function and moral implications—is the passage that follows, where the philosopher reflects on the equivocal ethical status of *lexis*, which becomes a necessary expedient[11] because of rhetoric's concern with *doxa* (1404a1–12):[12]

> ἀλλ' ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιόν ⟨ἐστι⟩ μηδὲν πλέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὥστε μήτε λυπεῖν μήτ' εὐφραίνειν· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.
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> But since the whole business of rhetoric is with opinion, one should pay attention to delivery, not because it is right but because it is necessary, since true justice seeks nothing more in a speech than neither to offend nor to entertain; for to contend by means of the facts themselves is just, with the result that everything except demonstration is incidental; but, nevertheless, [delivery] has

[10] These must be, I think, the antecedents of the αὐτῶν at 1403b35.

[11] On *lexis* as an expedient see immediately below.

[12] Although I quote here Ross's 1959 Greek text and Kennedy's 1991 translation, I will in the course of this article offer modifications to both, especially to Kennedy's rendering of *phantasia*. Kassel's 1976 text ad loc. does not offer any significant improvements over Ross's and, despite differences in detail, ultimately has the same meaning. He prefers the vulgate οὐκ ὀρθῶς at 1404a2 over the emended οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς; but an explicit ὡς is not required and, as Spengel 1867: 2.357 notes, it must be imported here from the ἀλλ' ὡς that follows. And at 1404a4 he emends ζητεῖν to ζητεῖ, preserving the readings πλείω (over πλέον) and ὡς (over ὥστε). Yet my argument is hardly affected by the difference between "justice is to seek nothing more (μηδὲν πλέον) than" and "justice does not at all (μηδὲν) seek more (πλείω) than" (the choice between ἢ ὥστε and ἤ ὡς seems to me largely indifferent; cf. Smyth §2007).

> great power, as has been said, because of the corruption of the audience. The subject of expression, however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show and intended to affect the audience. As a result, nobody teaches geometry this way.

This passage contains a remarkable admission regarding the entire rhetorical enterprise, one that belies the attempt of some to restrict to *hypokrisis* the unflattering *phortikon* of 1403b36, which has instead τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν as its proper subject.[13] Thus, even Cope 1877 ad loc. must make the following admission: "[N]ot only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικόν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind … and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial." But if Aristotle in this section considers *lexis* an expedient, strictly speaking, it is such only from the point of view of an ideal society. We are not faced here with an avoidable course of action, and therefore an unprincipled choice out of personal ease, selfish gain, or self-promotion. This is not to deny, of course, that a given speaker may harbor ethically dubious motivations; but the philosopher's point is that even an orator with the purest of intentions must have recourse to oral delivery, because no *polis* can boast of citizens who will embrace the bare facts of an issue without having to overcome the potential obstacles of misunderstanding and prejudice. This attitude should illuminate in turn our reading of 1404a2–7: "[J]ustice (τὸ δίκαιον) consists in seeking nothing more in connection with one's argument[14] than that one should cause neither pain nor pleasure;[15] for it is just to contend (ἀγωνίζεσθαι) with the facts alone" (αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν).[16] Too much has been made of these statements, with some even inferring that departing from this ideal would not be merely

[13] At 1403b36 the matter moves to the broader τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, which henceforth remains in view, as is shown by the syntactic agreement of *phortikon* and ὑπολαμβανόμενον (1403b36–1404a1) and the repetition at 1404a8, τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως. The syntactic agreement by itself would not be decisive, as a superficial substitution of *hypokrisis* by τοῦτο, without any change of the notional subject—a common occurrence—might be in view. But τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως is clearly intended to summarize and drive home the consequences of the preceding passage, i.e. 1403b36–1404a8, and this suffices to show that the broader τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, a topic neither limited to nor exclusive of *hypokrisis*, is its subject matter.

[14] Or "speech," περὶ τὸν λόγον.

[15] Hinting at *pathos*; cf. 1378a19–21.

[16] Cf. Smyth §1209a.

undesirable, but *unjust*; and it is further assumed that the οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος of 1404a2 corroborates this view. But the comparison aims not at discriminating justice from injustice, but at evoking an ideal vision of what strict justice calls for. This does not mean, then, that the contribution of *êthos* and *pathos* is *unjust*; simply that justice does not *require* it. This interpretation is proved by the ὥστε clause, which declares whatever else (τἆλλα) falls outside the realm of demonstration *not* unjust, but "superfluous," περίεργα.[17] The triumph of the ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι (1404a6)[18]—arguably necessary, but as noted, in strict justice, superfluous—is perhaps best exemplified by the abuse to which it is open, e.g. by the base appeal to emotions, a practice, however, not exclusively the province of delivery apart from style (strictly considered), but arguably most readily illustrated by the use of the *phônê*, viz., πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος (1403b27–28; cf. *De int.* I 16a3–4).

According to Aristotle, attention to style has a small, but necessary place in every διδασκαλία, for it makes a difference to clarity (πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι), yet not so much (τοσοῦτον)—i.e., its importance should not be overstated—but all this is *phantasia* directed towards the hearer.[19] πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι must not be overly restricted to *conceptual* clarity: Aristotle has in view such a presentation before the hearer as makes the *intentions* of the speaker—in their fullest scope, embracing not only the *logos* in the limited sense of 1356a3–4, but also the *êthos* and *pathos*—clear to his audience. Thus, at 1404b1–3, where ὁ λόγος is characterized as a kind of sign (σημεῖον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ὤν) that fails to achieve its proper end unless it be clear (ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ), the philosopher implicitly calls to mind the entire communication process, with the complete circle of its constituent parts.[20] It is true that here "clarity" is assigned to "proper words" (τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα), and stylistic propriety to all the others mentioned in the *Poetics* 1457b1–3: loan word, metaphor, ornament,

[17] Therefore, in οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς, "not because it is right," "right" does not mean "morally right" (with "unjust" or "morally wrong" as its opposite), but "correct," as in "the correct choice," the choice demanded and strictly justified by the circumstances. Cf. LSJ s.v. ὀρθός III.2 and Irwin 1985: 391.

[18] τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι here refers narrowly to the *rational* demonstration (i.e. the *enthymeme* derived from *pragma* or *logos*); for ἀπόδειξις and ἀποδεικνύναι in the *Rhetoric* see Grimaldi 1972: 139–41.

[19] I take καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν as epexegetic (cf. Smyth §2869a), i.e., as adding by way of clarification: "I mean [*phantasia*] towards the hearer."

[20] Here I follow the emendation by Richards (cf. Ross's *OCT*), which is clearly superior to the *paradosis*. Kassel accepts Vahlen's ὥστ' for Ross's ὥ and the ὡς of cod. Parisinus 1741 (both Ross and Kassel read τι for ὅτι). But "for *logos*, since it is a kind of sign, will not accomplish its goal unless…" is equivalent to "for *logos* [is] a kind of sign, so that it will not accomplish its goal unless…"

neologism, lengthening, contraction, and modification.[21] If this appears, on the surface, to restrict clarity to a mere subset of the whole range of stylistic devices (word order among them),[22] this is but a distorted impression that fails to account for what the philosopher says or implies elsewhere. So, e.g., metaphors, just classified among the τἆλλα ὀνόματα that contribute to propriety of style, are nevertheless ranked in *Rhetoric* 1404b31–32 with τὰ κύρια and τὰ οἰκεῖα as alone being serviceable (χρήσιμα) to prose style, so that, where one uses these well, "there will be an unfamiliar quality and [the art] will escape notice and *will be clear*" (Kennedy ad loc., my emphasis). In other words: we must grant a wider role to form, *including* ornamentation generally, in bringing about the requisite perspicuity;[23] and since form is connected with sense perception, this implies that *phantasia* affects clarity and must be part and parcel of effective communication.[24] The τοσοῦτον finds its conceptual (negative) correlative in the ἀλλά clause. The one who wishes to claim too broad a role for *lexis* should consider that it works on the hearer through *phantasia*: this fact will help him better to give it its due measure, neither under- nor overestimating its import. Happily, the philosopher does not leave us to feel our way blindly to the understanding of *phantasia*, but has already given us a working definition at 1370a28–30:[25] it is said to be "a kind of weak perception" (αἴσθησις), connected not only with sense perception but also with the mental faculties of memory and hope. Nevertheless, as I observed above, it appears to be the universal assumption of translators at 1404a11 that by *phantasia* Aristotle means "external show," "mere appearance," "fancy."[26] The reasons for this unanimity seem obvious: the appeals to *mokhthêria* and *phortikon* (1403b34, 36 and 1404a8) arguably call for a negative judgment; the concern with *lexis*, Aristotle admits, far from desirable in itself, is but a necessary concession (1404a2–3); ideally, what is not strict demonstration should be superfluous (1404a6–7); the often assumed close tie

[21] Halliwell's terms in his *LCL* translation.

[22] Cf. 1407b21–25 and 1410a20–23.

[23] Cf. 1417a16–19 and Halliwell 1993: 57 n. 12.

[24] This connection is especially clear where form finds immediate expression in visual or auditory effects. But, as follows from *Rh.* 1370a28–30, the ability itself to evoke mental images is mediated by prior sensory experience that is recalled by memory.

[25] ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει.

[26] Cope 1877 ad loc. renders it "fancy," adding that *phantasia* is "the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality" (with a reference to his note on *Rh.* I.11.6); Kennedy 1991 and Freese 1926 prefer "outward show"; Jebb, more cautious, retains the more traditional "imagination" (in Sandys, 1909, ad loc.); W. Rhys Roberts (in Ross, 1924, ad loc.), too, chooses "fanciful"; and Rapp 2002, "reiner Anschein."

between δηλῶσαι (1404a10) and *conceptual* clarity seems designed to render the bulk of stylistic analysis external show, superficial fancy.

QUESTIONING THE CONSENSUS

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to resist this interpretive consensus. Though perhaps understandable, it is partly the fruit of a long-standing prejudice against rhetoric and issues from a live suspicion of what this art portends for the pursuit of truth. Such mistrust has a distinguished ancient pedigree: the mention of *mokhthêria* and the use of *phortikon* show that Aristotle is not wholly impervious to it. But the philosopher's attitude is more pragmatic and positive than the current *communis opinio*, which has roots in Plato's anti-rhetorical dogmatism. Thus, if we translate *phantasia* as "mere appearance" *vel sim.* we displace the center of gravity of Aristotle's corrective and drive it to an unintended extreme.[27] Let us revisit the reasons adduced for the consensus view. The regretful reality of *mokhthêria* is but a consequence of the ethical cast inherent in any political[28] process.[29] This is clear from the contrast drawn between rhetoric and geometry, echoed again at 1417a19–21, this time by the opposition between μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι,[30] which have no ἤθη because they lack moral purpose, and the Σωκρατικοί, which do: it is the very nature of *rhêtorikê*—the fact that it addresses the need of the assembly (deliberative, forensic, or epideictic) to build consensus and manage dissent—that makes not only *logos*, but also *êthos* and *pathos* its necessary ingredients, and for this reason it holds both the promise of effective democratic governance[31] *and* the danger of the unprincipled exploitation of man's prejudice and vanity.[32]

[27] The philosopher's treatment represents a sort of *via media*.

[28] Here I employ "political" in that basic sense most readily illustrated by Aristotle's famous dictum that ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον (*Pol.* 1253a2–3).

[29] We need only cite 1356a25–27, where, from the tripartite division of rhetoric into *logos*, *êthos*, and *pathos*, Aristotle concludes: ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. Cf. *EN* 1094a27–b3. For the negative perspective, cf. Plato's *Gorgias* 463d1–2.

[30] Aristotle considers geometry a part of mathematics, as can be gathered from many passages in his works (cf. Heath 1949: 1–16), e.g. *Posterior Analytics* 77b26–33 and *Metaphysics* E 1026a25–27. See also *RE* s.v. *geometria*.

[31] Hence the transmitted reading πολιτειῶν at 1403b35, which Lossau 1971 justifiedly defends against the suspicions of Spengel 1867: 2.357, whose conjecture was accepted by Ross in his *OCT*.

[32] One need only remember that φορτικότης had made its appearance at 1395b2, in the chapter on maxims, long before the matter of style was broached. There Aristotle reflected

Now, as to the phrase καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, we are supposed to appraise it in light of the ensuing qualification, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον. Cope ad loc. renders it "and rightly so considered," adding Vettori's alternative "when considered aright," which he nevertheless rejects because the former alone "is the more *natural* interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνειν; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius 'Si vere *iudicare* volumus'" (1877: 6, his emphasis). If Cope is right, he at least cannot claim a large following,[33] nor is it clear why his is the "natural" translation and on what account Vettori's meaning (which glosses his translation *recte ponderatum*) is not allowable: for ὑπολαμβάνειν, as LSJ s.v. III.1 states, can mean "to take up a notion, assume, suppose," and hence "understand a thing to be so" or "conceive of something in a certain way," which implies a particular judgment and posture. The suggestion, then, is that the label *phortikon* for τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν holds in a restricted, yet basic, sense; and it does not take much effort to discover that here, as before, the logic behind this dim view of style is again the interaction between the unprincipled orator and his uncultivated audience, whose weaknesses he finds all too easy to exploit for selfish ends. As mentioned in n. 32, the corresponding noun has already made its appearance at 1395b2, but it is the treatment in chapter 26 of the *Poetics* that brings out most clearly its rationale. There, as the philosopher debates whether epic or tragedy is the superior *mimêsis*, we learn that the label "vulgar" does not so much inhere in the subject matter or practice at hand, as is intimately dependent on the target audience and the consequent interaction between performer and public: ἡ ἧττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατάς ἐστιν ἀεί (1461b27–29). In view is the practice of actors and *aulêtai* who feel the need to add beyond what is proper or called for, on

on the pleasure a hearer experiences when an orator hits upon opinions he already holds. Says Cope 1877: ad loc.: "The φορτικότης here ascribed to vulgar audiences is much the same as the μοχθηρία τῶν ἀκροατῶν, III 1.5, the vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι in order to convince them, because they are unable to appreciate logic alone." *Nota bene* 1395b12–13, where, as might be expected, we learn that the *ethical* character of the discourse is chiefly in view. Cf. also 1415b5–9: πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα· ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν.

[33] Freese writes "and rightly considered it is thought vulgar"; Kennedy, "delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood"; Jebb, "and, properly viewed, the subject is thought vulgar"; Dufour and Wartelle, "il semble d'ailleurs que ce soit là un art grossier à en juger sainement"; Rapp, "auch scheint es, richtig betrachtet, ungebührlich zu sein"; Tovar, "parece que es asunto fútil, bien considerado."

the assumption that the public will not otherwise notice and understand the performance. Therefore, "people say" (φασιν) that epic addresses itself πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς that need not such *skhêmata*, but tragedy πρὸς φαύλους (1462a2–4). To this Aristotle objects that the fault is not really *poiêtikê*'s; it should be laid at the door of *hypokritikê* (1462a5–6).[34]

So far, then, we have seen that *mokhthêria* and *phortikon* share a common root concern, one that does not inhere so much in *lexis* (and, by implication, *hypokrisis*) as in the potentially corrupt interplay between orator and audience. On the other hand, if used in a principled way, style and delivery can play a significant hand in advancing the principles of justice; for they help rhetoric fulfill its social promise, enabling truth and right to assert their natural superiority.[35] This consideration, by itself, should caution us against rendering *phantasia* by so utterly dismissive a gloss as "mere fancy." Several additional reasons concur with this judgment. After all, the entire rhetorical enterprise is branded as πρὸς δόξαν, and interpretive consistency would demand that a *phantasia* which is no more than "outward show" tarnish with its stain the very art of oratory. Cope (1877: 7) appears to realize this when, quoting *Eudemian Ethics* I.4.2, λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν [τὰς τέχνας] τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, he adds: "This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν"; and though parenthetically he glosses πρὸς δόξαν as "directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ εἶναι," he softens the outcome in translation by rendering the offending sentence: "But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific" (7). In fact, one might

[34] In the *Politics* 8.6 (1340b20ff.) Aristotle takes up the question whether the education of freeborn youth πρὸς ἀρετήν should include *mousikê*. The inquiry, addressing itself to those who claim that it is a menial occupation, suggests that *mousikê* is beneficial, so long as the degree to which it is practiced is carefully regulated. At 1341b8–18, explaining the opprobrium that falls on professional education, Aristotle makes clear that what associates a trade with the adjective *phortikos* (and, in this case, also earns it the label θητικός) is the focus on the hearers, specifically, on their pleasure, which is compared unfavorably with personal *aretê*, so that "professional" practice is rendered illiberal: "for base is the target at which they aim." A θεατὴς φορτικός corrupts the τεχνῖται who ply their trade with him in view. Cf. 1342a18–21, Plato's *Laws* II 659b–c, and especially Plato's *Gorgias* 512e5–13c2, with its insistence on the necessary conformity (as μιμητής) of the orator to his audience and their πολιτεία, if he desires to wield influence in the city (μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, 513a3–4).

[35] Cf. 1355a21–23, a passage whose text is the object of much disagreement, but whose implications ultimately are surprisingly tolerant of the various options. See further below, p. 121.

even question his *comparandum*, for Rackham's *LCL* translation of *Eudemian Ethics* 1215a29–30 is not "ostentatious" or "hollow," but the far more neutral "pursued only for reputation." (Reputation and truth need not be at odds.) Since the semantic range of *doxa* is broad enough indeed to allow for "show," "ostentation" (should the context call for it), it might be inadvisable to look for guidance in the *Eudemian Ethics*, especially when the statement needing clarification contains a sweeping characterization of oratory as a *tekhnê*, and the *Rhetoric* itself does not fail to provide us with parallels that make the present one clear.

Let us consider again the opposition between πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and πρὸς δόξαν, adduced by Cope in support of his "ostentatious and hollow." This opposition does, in fact, occur at 1365b1, in the seventh chapter of *Rhetoric* I, where Aristotle considers *greater* and *smaller* in connection with the potential disagreement between opposing parties over the degree of significance of a matter that is the object of debate. The abstract *greater* and *smaller* are illustrated with particular oppositions, such as *often* versus *seldom*, *proper* versus *acquired*, or *ends* versus *means*. The polarity that now occupies us ("what has respect to *truth* is greater than what has respect to *doxa*") is just one of these, and the philosopher offers the following clarification: "The definition of *related to opinion* is what a person would not choose if he were going to escape notice. As a result, to get a benefit would seem to be more [often] chosen than to do good; for a person will choose the former even if it escapes [others'] notice, but it is not the general view that one would choose to do good secretly. And things people wish to exist in reality [are preferable] to their semblance; for they are more related to truth. Thus, people say that even justice is a small thing, because it rather *seems* to be preferable than *is*. But this is not the case with health."[36] Aristotle could not be clearer: that has respect to *doxa* which one would not choose when likely to escape others' notice. The focus is clearly on appearances in a social context—what we might call "social pretense" if "pretense" did not carry such negative connotations. The concern is arguably for one's reputation in society, for affecting the views that others have of us, for creating a social standing or managing our neighbors' attitudes towards us. To use Aristotle's own word as I believe he conceives of it, this would be a matter of *phantasia*, of how we appear, of being aware of and trying to

[36] Kennedy ad loc. (his emphasis). ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιτο· διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ' εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὔ (1365b1–8).

control the impact one's behavior has on the way we come across, of giving expression to a particular *êthos* in a manner, if not so technically proficient as that of a professional orator, yet not entirely different in kind from it.[37] Such *phantasia* could, of course, involve empty show and ostentation, but it need not do so; and it has a legitimate claim on our interest as social beings. The examples point this out well: doing good versus faring well, or even justice versus health. No sham is involved in the act of conferring benefits on others: the suggestion is not that it looks *as if* someone is doing good while he is not; the point is simply that the benefaction is done with an eye to the profit that accrues to one's reputation with his neighbors. As to the latter opposition (i.e. justice versus health), no one would insist on a necessary connection between doing justice and mere outward show or ostentation;[38] but, clearly, whether a person or action is just is subject to debate and opinion in ways that the physical condition of a man—healthy or diseased—is not. It is in this sense, because it is open to judgment and pretension, that justice is said to be "a small thing." The overriding concern, therefore, is with reputation, with social appearances (one might say *êthos*), and this is precisely what πρὸς δόξαν is intended to convey.[39]

[37] Though here *phantasia* and φαίνεσθαι do not themselves occur, we have several instances of their semantic opposite in this context, viz. λανθάνω.

[38] As scholars have suggested, the choice of justice as an illustration might hint at an ongoing polemic with some of the more outrageous sophists, who may have publicly owned appearing just preferable to actually being so. (The φασί would then have specific subjects in view, which the reader in turn would be expected to identify. Thus, e.g., in Plato's *Republic* II 362e4–363a5 Adeimantos notes that parents commend justice for the good repute that accrues from it and the benefits that attend on such public esteem [cf. 365b4–7, 366d7–e5, and 367b6–c1].) This would go some ways towards explaining the statement, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον. It would, indeed, be surprisingly if this apparently sweeping and rather pessimistic judgment represented the view of the common man. Or are we to believe that most Athenians really thought the appearance of justice more desirable than its reality?

[39] Translators agree, rendering πρὸς δόξαν at 1404a1 "to influence opinion" (Freese), "with opinion" (Kennedy), "auf die Meinung abzielt" (Rapp), "ne s'attache qu'à l'opinion" (Dufour and Wartelle). Jebb's "aims at appearance" and Tovar's "apariencia" approach Cope, but show greater restraint as neither carries the negative connotations of "show" and "ostentation." Indeed, both can be argued to imply "opinion" and hence are, in my view, acceptable equivalents. Of the other occurrences of *doxa* in the *Rhetoric*, those at 1360b22, 1362b20, 1367a17, 1368b23, 1371a16, 1388a2, 1388a7, and 1404a25 clearly (1397b28 probably) carry the meaning "reputation" (cf. also 1372b21–22); at 1381b20 τὰ πρὸς δόξαν (as 1381b31 makes clear) refers to anything that affects the opinion the public has of us (hence our "reputation"), and is opposed to τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, "what is actually true," for there may, of course, be a gap between one's reputation and one's true character; at 1384a20–25 too the argument hinges on "loss of reputation" (περὶ ἀδοξίας),

Another reason to reject the extreme translation of *phantasia* is the statement that "the matter of *lexis* has some small [but] necessary part in every διδασκαλία" (1404a9). Here *didaskalia* is preferred to *tekhnê*, I think, because of the demonstrative nature of oratorical practice. Aristotle probably has in mind the centrality of "proof" to trial and deliberative assembly (and, in smaller measure, to epideictic argumentation).[40] And, in this restricted sense, the speaker can be said to "teach" his audience the relevant facts—just as the geometer (the philosopher's illustration) can be said to prove a particular theorem. For the former, however, the demonstration is πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, whereas the latter does it, so to speak, πρὸς αὐτόν. Hence the διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει: not that the geometrical proof cannot be directed at others; but that, by the nature of its reasoning, it is either correct or incorrect; and, if the former, it is so for one and all—the geometer as much as anyone else. Not so in the case of a rhetorical demonstration, which can be compelling to one, yet fail to convince another.[41] This is why he writes, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, where I do not, as others, punctuate with a comma before καί, which I take as adverbial, not

an opinion (δόξα) men heed only on account of those who hold it (οἱ δοξάζοντες); "opinion" is the proper rendering too at 1369a22, 1377b3, 1378b11, 1391b23, 1395b3, 1403a32, and 1412a28 (here best translated "expectation"), and perhaps at 1384b23 (though I rather incline, with Kennedy, to "reputation"). (The well known idiomatic παρὰ δόξαν needs no discussion.) The only other relevant section is *Rh.* II.1, whose principal thrust is the importance of showing oneself to be, and rendering the *kritês*, of a certain type (1377b23–24, the former pertains to *êthos*, the latter to *pathos*). The point is constructing a convincing *persona*, articulating and sustaining a particular view of oneself, managing one's reputation with his hearers, how one comes across: hence the recurrence of φαίνεσθαι (at 1377b26, 29, 31; 1378a4, 16).

[40] Note the similar use in the *Poetics* at 1456b5 (and Lucas, 1968, ad loc.). See also Plato's *Gorgias* 453d7–54e2, where both rhetoric and διδασκαλικαὶ τέχναι are said to work conviction (they are πειθοῦς δημιουργοί, 453e4–5). For Socrates, however, the parallel between them breaks down when it comes to truth-value: whereas *pistis* can be false, *mathêsis* (the goal of *didaskein*) cannot.

[41] The same distinction is implicit at 1355a24–29, where we learn that not even fortified with the sharpest knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) would a speaker be able to convince all. Cf. *Soph. el.* I.2 (165b1–9) and *Top.* 159a28–30. Where *didaskalia* is involved, the teacher brings out the clear and necessary consequences of a subject's own peculiar principles, and he secures the necessary assent of the learner. This can well happen in the formal instruction of an *epistêmê* (say, geometry), given a pupil of the requisite ability; but it is hardly possible with each and every member of a given audience, and certainly not so where considerations of *êthos* and *pathos* play a role: then we are reduced to using common notions (τὰ κοινά) to make our arguments (*pisteis* and *logoi*). See Rapp 2002: 2.92–95 and Grimaldi 1980: 28–29.

conjunctive;[42] for *phantasia* is present *even* in the study of geometry[43]—and hence cannot be "mere show" or "ostentation"—but there it is πρὸς αὐτόν, not πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, as in the case of rhetoric or, more broadly, wherever teaching takes place and the instructive and persuasive aspects of any *tekhnê* are called into action.[44]

PHANTASIA IN ARISTOTLE'S *OEUVRE*

A final reason to oppose "mere show," "ostentation" for *phantasia* lies in the use Aristotle commonly makes of this term. The initial suggestion that in *Rhetoric* 1404a11 *phantasia* meant "pomp, ostentation" goes back to Freudenthal (1863: 17–18) and his attempt to explain the restriction "if we are not speaking metaphorically" in *De anima* (=*DA*) 428a1–4. Nussbaum (1978: 254), the one scholar after Cope principally responsible for popularizing Freudenthal's idea,[45] realizes that it renders trivial Aristotle's comment in *De anima*:

> [H]e seems to be saying, 'Assuming when we say *phantasia* we mean the faculty in virtue of which we are appeared to in such-and-such a way, and we are not using the transferred sense according to which it means (mere) show, *then* it can be said that in virtue of *phantasia* we tell truth or falsehood—whereas to say, "in virtue of ostentatiousness we tell truth or falsehood" would be silly.' It will be objected that this is a trivial point. But for Aristotle it is never trivial to recognize all the senses of a word.

[42] My argument, of course, does not turn merely on a matter of punctuation—whether a comma should precede the καί. But understanding *phantasia* as "ostentation" has recently been helped by a tendency to weaken ever so slightly the immediacy of its connection in this sentence to the hearer: "all this is mere show, and [all of it is directed] towards the hearer." But if, as I claim, Aristotle has in view the orator's crafting of *phantasmata* for the hearing (and viewing) of his audience, one might expect him to say ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν. And he could further emphasize the target of this *phantasia* by placing an adverbial καί before πρός. This, I submit, is precisely the case; and if such is the point of the phrase, the editor should not punctuate with a pause after ἐστί. Omitting the comma by itself does not, of course, prejudice the interpretation and would be the safest editorial choice: hence neither Bekker, nor Spengel, Roemer, or Kassel, not even Cope and Sandys feature the comma; Ross and Dufour and Wartelle do. Yet a translation, when there is one, often makes the structure of the editor's thought clear.

[43] Cf. *De Mem.* 449b30–450a1: περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος; and 450a4–5: καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν νοῇ, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ' οὐχ ᾗ ποσόν.

[44] Cf. 1355b28 and Grimaldi's 1980: 36 comment apropos πειστική. For the twofold relation of a speech πρὸς τὰ πράγματα and πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατάς, cf. Theophrastos's fragments 64 and 65 in Wimmer 1862 (or 78 in Fortenbaugh et al. 1985).

[45] Cf. Cope (1877) ad *Rh.* I.11.6.

This last observation notwithstanding, the point *is* trivial, and it is hard to believe that Aristotle would have felt the need to preclude such a misunderstanding—not to mention that, as argued below (p. 116), this meaning was simply not commonly available until the much later time of Polybios.[46] This is not the place to conduct a survey of the intricate and extensive scholarly debate on Aristotle's concept of *phantasia*.[47] Some have even questioned whether he held a single, consistent view of its meaning throughout his works.[48] But if one can detect some measure of disjunction between (and at times even within) his various works, this takes place against a background of overall conceptual coherence. It is, at any rate, clear that the meaning alleged by Cope, and widely accepted by other translators, cannot be paralleled in any other passage of Aristotle. Thus, Wedin (1988: 68) notes: "Following Freudenthal, [Nussbaum] remarks that φαντασία can mean '(mere) show, pomp, ostentatiousness' and argues that this is the metaphorical sense meant in [*De anima*] 428a1–4. The remark on the point of usage is acceptable, but that 428a2 counts as a case in point is, I submit, mistaken. An initial reservation is that *only one passage* in Aristotle can be marshaled in support of the Freudenthal reading, namely *Rhetorica* 1404a11" (my emphasis).

But, even if they do not go so far as to adopt "mere show" or "pomp," several scholars move in that direction by arguing in favor of a strictly non-technical "appearance." Thus, Halliwell (1993: 59 n. 16) remarks that the term is not used in its "psychological sense, but [taken] to mean merely 'appearance', as at *Sophistic Refutations* 4.165b25." My problem with this comment is that his otherwise unobjectionable "merely 'appearance'"—where "appearance" can be neutral enough simply to denote "what appears to the thinking (or sensing) subject"—seems to connote "mere appearance," which in turn is glossed by "show"; thus we move quickly from "appearance" to the objectionable "mere ostentation or show," the very meaning that cannot be substantiated from any Aristotelian passage—unless, of course, one chooses to call "mere show" any appearance that happens to be false (as *phantasia* can certainly be). The *locus* adduced in support is a case in point: ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἐξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως (165b24–27). Doubtless here the "appearance" in question is false: false logic is the focus of

[46] For a better solution to what Aristotle means by κατὰ μεταφοράν, see Wedin 1988: 69–70.

[47] A debate, however, that has overlooked almost entirely *Rh.* III.1. For helpful overviews see, e.g., Rees 1971, Schofield 1992, Watson 1988, and Wedin 1988. For a partial bibliographical update see Fedele 1999 and Riccardo 1999.

[48] Cf. Frede 1992: 279–82.

the treatise, a point its opening reiterates by referring to οἱ φαινόμενοι ἔλεγχοι (164a20–21) and συλλογισμοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ ὄντες δοκοῦσι (164a23–24). But, there is nothing here of "mere ostentation," for the superficiality of false reasoning is quite another from the "sensual show" alleged at *Rhetoric* 1404a11. *Sophistic Refutations* is not, after all, an ethical treatise that looks into the motivations of deceitful sophists in order to condemn them for their ostentation. Furthermore, I fail to see why this instance of *phantasia* (or the one at 168b19) should not have "its psychological sense."[49] For Aristotle himself draws the parallel between the inexperienced, who reasons and refutes falsely, and "those who view things from a distance" (164b27), a formulation strongly reminiscent of the passage in *De anima* (428b17–22) where, discussing why *phantasia* can be false, Aristotle distinguishes between perception of τὰ ἴδια and perception of the αἰσθητά to which these ἴδια belong:[50] "As to the whiteness of an object, sense is never mistaken, but it may be mistaken as to whether the white object is this thing or something else."[51] This comment must in turn be read against 430b29–30: "But just as sight perception of a proper object (τὸ ἴδιον) is [always] true, while [our perception] whether the white thing is or is not a man is not always true, so it is with immaterial objects." Thus, when Aristotle mentions the error of "those who view things from a distance," *De anima* leads me to believe that most likely he has in mind the false *phantasma* that results from viewing an object from too far. I might add that the sources of false *phantasia* in *Soph. el.* 165b26–27, "the ambiguity of a term, the ambiguity of a proposition, the possibility of wrong disjunction, the possibility of wrong conjunction, the possibility of wrong accentuation, and similarity of termination" (Poste's, 1866, translation ad loc.), have their grounds in aural or visual *phantasia*.[52] Such errors come from the application of *nous* to what one hears or reads (the *phantasmata*), e.g. in syntactic or semantic parsing, where learning (and hence memory) and deductive logic are involved. This would seem to me to fall squarely under the psychological sense of *phantasia*.[53]

Fortenbaugh 2002: 96–100, too, adopts an approach similar to Halliwell's in order to oppose the analysis of human emotions as "*phantasia* apart from belief": he denies any "scientific" intent in Aristotle's account of *phantasia* in the *Rhetoric* (citing in support, as Halliwell, *Soph. el.* 164a20–24). Accordingly,

[49] LSJ s.v. 1.b places 165b25 under "less scientifically, *appearance*," still not its fourth division "parade, ostentation."

[50] On ἴδια see below, p. 123.

[51] Hicks's 1907 translation: *ad* 428b21–22.

[52] Concerning non-visual *phantasmata*, see Frede 1992: 285.

[53] Note also Halliwell's 1993: 60 n.19 self-corrective.

any references to "appearance" would not pertain to the "biological faculty of *phantasia*" (*ibid.* 96): recognizing that courts and assemblies make decisions on the grounds of probabilities, not certain knowledge, the philosopher "is careful to speak of what appears to be the case," thus "calling attention to the fact that human emotions are caused by beliefs, which may or may not be true" (*ibid.* 97). But I fail to see why such a stance would prevent *phantasia* from being the psychological faculty more fully (and precisely) discussed in *De anima*. Of course it is possible to use φαίνεσθαι without implying any particular psychological framework: the word, by itself, will not settle whether its register is technical or colloquial, nor, if technical, the degree of precision invoked. But Fortenbaugh elides the fact that not only the verb but also the noun, *phantasia*, is used, for which it is harder to argue a colloquial meaning devoid of any technical import. That Aristotle associates *phantasia* and αἴσθησις at *Rhetoric* 1370a28–30, in fact, seems to militate against a strictly colloquial register for the verb and its noun, even in the context of the oratorical treatise. I would argue, moreover, that, considering the philosopher's undeniable interest in the epistemological role of *phantasia*, one should assume, *ceteris paribus*, that in the rhetorical context of truth-seeking and decision-making φαίνεσθαι is more likely to bear a degree of technical precision than to be strictly colloquial, "unscientific," and devoid of psychological overtones. It seems to me that Fortenbaugh's rationale for a cleavage between *De anima* and the *Rhetoric* (see, e.g., Fortenbaugh, 2002: 100) is the distinction drawn in *DA* III.3 between *phantasia* and *doxa*, which allows a degree of psychological detachment to a subject who, pondering his *phantasia*, denies it conviction (the *pistis* that accompanies *doxa*), resisting its implications (as when, looking at a picture, we know—however horrifying the depiction—that we need not flee from it as if from imminent danger). But it is *precisely* this effect of attachment to or detachment from a particular "view" that opponents at law try to induce among the jury. Once rhetorical persuasion is achieved, the "picture" carries the conviction of truth and action follows. Naturally, Aristotle need not raise in the *Rhetoric* aspects of *phantasia* that follow from non-rational animals' possession of this faculty, since the purview of oratory is strictly *logos*-endowed man.[54]

Now, it is not only the case that the works of Aristotle fail to produce a single instance for which "ostentatiousness" correctly translates *phantasia*: in fact such a meaning finds no parallel in the literature before Aristotle's time. The closest approach is the use of the *verb* φαντάζειν (*not* the noun *phantasia*) in

[54] Cf. the helpful analysis in Rapp 2002: 2.575 and 2.621 (*ad Rh.* 1382a21).

Hdt. 7.10ε,[55] a context in which, it is true, "to show oneself" may be deemed less compelling than "to make an arrogant display of oneself." But we are simply not entitled to read *our* view of what is contextually compelling into the received lexical meaning of a term—a meaning, besides, that in this case quite adequately suits the context—unless we can support the corresponding modification of or extension to the lexicon by additional instances that clearly require it. Here it is not so. Artabanos's comment hinges on the contrast between ὑπερέχοντα ζῷα, "prominent animals," and σμικρά, "small": god strikes the former with his thunderbolts and does not allow them to show themselves—a hyperbole allowed for its exemplary value. Some might draw the inference that "prominent animals" are "creatures of greatness," wont "to display their pride" (to quote A. D. Godley's *LCL* translation): in their eyes, this may color φαντάζεσθαι, whose proper meaning is "to appear," with a note of arrogance. But if so, such semantic coloring is strictly *contextual* and this instance *per se* should not receive its own lemma in the lexicon (LSJ s.v. II.2). To be sure, such hypothetical contextual color would resemble the late use of φαντασία for "outward show" and "ostentation"—for which there are, however, no examples before Aristotle, and which, in my view, the alleged passage of the *Rhetoric* does not illustrate either. Indeed, even if for the sake of argument one should grant the validity of the acceptation of the LSJ "to make a show," one cannot argue convincingly from what would be, under those circumstances, a single, exceptional meaning of the verb φαντάζειν in Herodotos[56] that its corresponding noun, *phantasia*, also in that same exceptional sense, was conceptually available to Aristotle; and, furthermore, that he actually used *phantasia* with that anomalous meaning once and only once in his entire *oeuvre*, departing in so doing from other senses frequently attested elsewhere in his works. I find this unpersuasive, especially when the number of such instances of *phantasia* exceed one hundred, giving more than ample scope for potential parallels—parallels that fail to materialize.

[55] Warning Xerxes about the peril of rash arrogance, Artabanos remarks: ὁρᾷς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ζῷα ὡς κεραυνοῖ ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ἐᾷ φαντάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὐδέν μιν κνίζει. How and Wells 1912 ad loc. write: "[P]roperly show oneself (iv.124.2; vii.15.2); here *se ostentare*, 'make a show of oneself'," noting, moreover, its agreement with Polybios' usage.

[56] I have not been able to turn up any other incontrovertible use of the verb in this peculiar sense before Aristotle. As to the noun *phantasia*, the only other text cited by LSJ s.v. 4 that, in the opinion of some, might lend credence to the modern consensus on *Rh.* 1404a11 is [Hippokrates'] *Decorum* 7, which indeed belongs under "ostentation" (cf. Jouanna 1999: 75–111). But according to a recent detailed linguistic study by Valdés (1992), "with a fair degree of certainty" the earliest possible date for this treatise is the second century AD (p. 304).

Are we really to believe on the basis of a precedent so slim that, at best, only one Herodotean passage can be adduced for it that Aristotle departed from the received meaning of the noun and his own usage elsewhere, attested by so many passages? Admitting such a departure would only be justified under rather stringent contextual constraints, i.e., only if the local context should categorically demand it. I have already listed several reasons that, in fact, suggest that no such necessity obtains. My case will be further strengthened if I can show that the philosopher's use of *phantasia* elsewhere also suits *Rhetoric* III.1: this I shall do presently.[57] Aristotle's interest, our critics notwithstanding, is with the psychology of perception and the mediating role *phantasia* plays between sense perception (αἴσθησις) and judgment (ὑπόληψις): "Imagination, in fact, is something different both from perception and from thought, and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than is belief apart from imagination" (*DA* 427b14–16).[58] If rhetoric studies the means for persuasive speech, surely its practical goal is to persuade or dissuade the audience; hence, in its *polis* setting and at the level of civic action, rhetoric becomes a legitimate object of interest in the study of "animal motion," though here the ζῷον in question is one that possesses *phônê* and *logos* and is eminently *politikon*. It is in this context that *phantasia* and *phantasmata*—their generic role in voluntary movement—enter into the considerations of the orator and the teacher of oratory.

[57] Quite apart from the uniqueness of Hdt. 7.10ε and the reasons just offered for a reading of φαντάζεσθαι *sensu stricto*, it is pertinent to remember that verbs and nouns do not always possess the same semantic range. In this connection, Martínez Hernández 1997: 196 criticizes precisely the failure to keep lexical fields and lexical spheres separate, as when verbs and nouns are mixed, forgetting "[el] carácter paradigmático del campo, que exige establecer las oposiciones sobre las que se estructura entre lexemas de una sola clase" (cf. Coseriu and Geckeler 1981: 56–59). To illustrate this point, one need only consider ποιέω, ποίησις, and ποιητής, which have areas of overlap and disjunction; or, to use an English example, the word "trip": its noun, widely used for "short journey," now rarely (if ever) for "a nimble step" or "a stumble"; its verb, in turn, hardly ever for "making a trip or excursion." There are also adjectives without corresponding verbs ("pregnant" is very common; "pregnate" rare and obsolete, "impregnate" taking its place), verbs without their nouns ("cleave," "to part," owns "cleft"; but "cleave," "to adhere," lacks a noun), etc. On such gaps, see Geckeler 1976: 158–60 or Gutiérrez Ordóñez 1989: 104–5. Lexical semantics is too complex to allow for unexamined extrapolations. Not even when, in their full diachronic sweep, a verb and its noun are attested with one and the same meaning should their synchrony be assumed. (On this caution cf. Coseriu 1981: 109–13.) Cf., further, Schofield 1992: 251 n. 11.

[58] Hicks's 1907 translation ad loc. φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. Cf. *DA* 427b27–28.

But before we consider the *Rhetoric*'s own engagement with *phantasia*, we must briefly survey statements elsewhere that illuminate the conceptual background of this word. A convenient starting point is *DA* 433b27–30: "Thus, then, in general terms, as already stated, the animal is capable of moving itself just in so far as it is appetitive: and it cannot be appetitive without imagination. Now imagination may be rational or it may be imagination of sense. Of the latter the other animals also have a share."[59] This passage teaches us that motion must be traced to desire, desire that is not without *phantasia*; and that *phantasia* can be categorized as to its connection with either *logos* or perception.[60] Such λογιστικὴ φαντασία recalls a later section of the same work[61] which speaks of ἡ βουλευτικὴ [φαντασία] ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (434a7), "the deliberative *phantasia* in rational beings": using reason a man decides whether he will do this or that (pursuing the greater good), and proves that he is not moving ἀορίστως (434a4), like the lowest animals, but measuring by a single standard; thus it follows that he is able, from many *phantasmata*, to fashion one course of action.[62] The operative word here is *bouleutikê*, which highlights the corresponding role assigned to

[59] Hicks's 1907 translation ad loc. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.

[60] Though the ἢ...ἤ are disjunctive, the alternatives need not be mutually exclusive: they may simply offer two complementary ways of viewing any *phantasia*, ways that depend on the point of view chosen. That is to say, even the λογιστική may, on further consideration, turn out to be connected to αἴσθησις in a manner still to be determined (cf. *DA* 432a3–10). On this point, see Wedin 1988: 114 and Labarrière 1984: 47 n. 32.

[61] *DA* 434a5–10: ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν).

[62] With Wedin 1988: 82–83, I take "deliberative imagination" to mean "imagination connected with deliberation," just as the *logistikê* is that connected with *logos*, without prejudicing the question whether such "imagination" always preexists reflection or else can also be forged by the deliberative process. There is no clear proof here of *phantasia* as functionally complete, and Wedin's 1988: 45–63 proposal may stand. This conclusion holds even if we understand the ἕν of ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων as ἓν [φάντασμα], for deliberation would still have the active role. At any rate, it is clear from *DA* 434a10–11 (καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει) that the mind indeed constructs *phantasmata* through its deliberative faculty, for, *contra* Wedin 1988: 147 n. 60, we must read τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ as τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ [φαντασίαν], as Hicks 1907: 567 and Nussbaum 1978: 264 n. 66 (among many) point out. Cf. *De Mem.* 453a14: τὸ βουλεύεσθαι συλλογισμός τίς ἐστιν.

phantasia in deliberating a course of action.[63] There is only a small distance from this to a corresponding *symbuleutic*, i.e. social, dimension, as the orator artfully crafts *phantasmata* that will prompt his hearers to do this or that. This argument precludes the facile criticism that rhetoric merely addresses itself to no more than the passions of the audience, in a manipulative attempt to elicit behavior that is as irrational (or less than rational) as it is beneficial to the speaker (just as "desire" is said at times to overpower βούλησις, *DA* 434a12–13). No; the text tells us plainly that choosing a plan of action is the work of λογισμός, and, in so doing, promotes *phantasia* (with its ethical and emotional components and the *lexis* that expresses them) to a cardinal tool of the rhetorical task.

For Aristotle, then, *phantasia*—the soul's [re]presentational[64] device—mediates between sense perception and the critical faculties[65] that, apprehending the object as desirable or undesirable, move one towards or away from it. But αἰσθήματα are not the only immediate sources of *phantasmata*: hope and memory too are associated with *phantasia*,[66] and more generally *logos* and *noêsis*: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως (*De motu an.* 702a17–19). The causal chain is: "thought" or "sense perception" → *phantasia* → "desire" → "bodily affections" → motion. As the translation indicates, in the previous passage the word *pathê* stands for bodily changes (chillings and heatings),[67] not for the psychic affections that attend *phantasia* and are studied in *Rhetoric* II (see below, p. 124). These latter *pathê* would not follow, but precede, desire; in other words, they would constitute motivations for judgments or actions.[68] Perception and thought are "critical" faculties the soul uses to judge: ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις

[63] Cf. *DA* 431b6–8: ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα. Clearly, these *phantasmata* are *logistika* and *bouleutika*.

[64] Though my analysis does not depend for its validity on it, I am attracted to Wedin's 1988 view of *phantasia* as functionally incomplete (cf. *DA* 429a1–2) and co-occurring with actual exercises of functionally complete faculties (see his chapter 2 for an explication). Thus I also follow his use of brackets for "[re]presentation," which is intended, he notes, "to alert the reader to the fact that I am not foisting on Aristotle the view that we do not actually perceive objects but only make inferences to them from Hume-like images" (Wedin 1988: 17 n.27).

[65] *DA* 431a14–15: τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει.

[66] *Rh.* 1370a29–30. On this passage and its context see below, p. 124.

[67] Cf. Nussbaum 1978: 154 n. 19.

[68] On *pathê* influencing judgment as opposed to action see Striker 1996: 292–93.

ἡ τῶν ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως... (*DA* 432a15–16); and if *phantasia* according to Aristotle depends on perception, and thought, in turn, cannot happen without it,[69] it should not surprise us to read the following: "Now we see that the movers of the animal are reasoning and *phantasia* and choice and wish and appetite. And all of these can be reduced to thought and desire. For both *phantasia* and sense-perception hold the same place as thought, since all are concerned with making distinctions (κριτικά)" (*De motu an.* 700b17–21).[70] It can hardly be accidental that, in arguing for the usefulness of rhetoric, Aristotle should censure *kriseis* that happen μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον (*Rh.* 1355a22–23), implying that "the agent responsible for permitting the bad judgments is a rhetoric which does not achieve its perfection as rhetoric, and thus fails to realize its usefulness" (Grimaldi 1980: 27). Though "judgments" here are the decisions of the courts, these are but the social expression (at the civic level) of the individual's proper use of his own faculties of judgment.[71]

This line of reasoning is of a piece with Aristotle's division of the soul into two parts: one that possesses *logos*, the other *alogon* (*EN* 1102a27–28). The former he divides further into the *epistêmonikon*, which studies things whose principles (ἀρχαί) cannot be otherwise, and the *logistikon*, which makes calculating (λογίζεσθαι) and deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι) its task (*EN* 1139a3–8): τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν (*EN* 1139a12–14). Drawing our attention to the appearance of *epistêmonikon* at *DA* 434a16, Labarrière 1984: 30 plausibly argues that the subdivision of the soul with *logos* is in view throughout this section of *De anima*, where the philosopher discusses the λογιστικὴ φαντασία. The effect of this terminology is to underline the involvement of *logos*—*ratio* and *oratio*—as *nous* makes use of the corresponding *phantasmata*

[69] *DA* 431a16–17: διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή.

[70] Nussbaum's 1978 translation ad loc. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα. Citing a study by John Cooper, Nussbaum 1978: 334 notes that "there is no need to interpret [κρίνειν] as implying that any kind of explicit or reflective judgment is taking place—and in particular … it need not be associated with 'explicit verbal performance or the disposition to such'—as indeed we can readily infer from [Aristotle's] ascription of κρίνειν to animals." The point is well taken. But a restriction necessary in the case of animals without *logos* must not disallow the otherwise legitimate implications of the philosopher's statement for the social world of the *polis*. Therefore, I think it is right to consider his analysis in the context of *krisis* that involves discursive thought and decision making.

[71] Cf. *Rh.* 1377b20–22, which plainly states that ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική.

in forming a *hypolêpsis*. Like Plato before him (but with greater conceptual clarity)[72] Aristotle placed desire in the sphere of *logos*, and therefore made it, in some measure, the object of persuasion and rational appeal. We find this clearly stated at *Rhetoric* 1370a18–27: ἐπιθυμία (which he defines as "a desire for what is pleasant") can be *alogos* or μετὰ λόγου;[73] the former kind does not come ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν, "from forming an opinion" (e.g. hunger, thirst, or sleep); of the latter kind, he writes: μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες (1370a25–27). Thus, the craving in this case comes from persuasion (whence, by implication, one forms *hypolêpseis*)—in particular, from aural persuasion: "for they often long to see and acquire when they have heard and been persuaded."[74] I do not think that ἀκούσαντες and πεισθέντες are conceptually coordinated, as if the former merely referred to learning about something by word of mouth, with the latter conveying the exercise of reason that results in conviction. Rather, I believe that Aristotle has selected the common scenario of rhetorical persuasion to illustrate the division (only too apposite a choice, given the subject matter of his treatise), and that the participles, conceptually subordinated, might be translated thus: "for they often long to see and acquire when convinced by hearing [an oral argument]." This serves well to remind us that, for Aristotle, the rhetorical endeavor is preeminently of an oral (and hence aural) nature.

PHANTASIA IN THE *RHETORIC*

We have already seen that there are good reasons to reject the superficial meaning of *phantasia*, "mere show," for *Rhetoric* III.1, and that Aristotle's uniform practice elsewhere points to the psychological understanding of the term. We are not surprised, then, that the first occurrence of *phantasia* in the *Rhetoric*

[72] Cf. Fortenbaugh 1986: 249 and 2002: 23–44.

[73] From the point of view of the terminology employed this contradicts 1369a1–4, where βούλησις (described as "a desire for what is good") is assigned to the λογιστικὴ ὄρεξις, but ὀργή and ἐπιθυμία to the ἄλογος ὄρεξις. The disagreement, however, is superficial, for, as Grimaldi 1980: 231 explains, the same conceptual schema detailed in *EN* 1102a26–3a10 underlies both passages. Indeed, at *EN* 1102b13–14 Aristotle mentions a subdivision of the soul's ἄλογον μόριον that "somehow shares in *logos*" ([ἄλλη τις φύσις] μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου), for it responds differently in the continent and incontinent man. And a few lines later, at 1102b29–31, he structures the opposition as one between the *phytikon*, which "in no wise shares in *logos*," and the *epithymêtikon* (and in general the *orektikon*), which "somehow does share [in *logos*], in that it hearkens to it and obeys it" (τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν).

[74] Reading πολλά adverbially and verbs and participles absolutely.

is found at 1370a28, the passage that closed our previous section, and that it appears in an argument about the very desires that are open to persuasion and should therefore be of concern to the orator (1370a27–32):

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, κἀεὶ ἐν[75] τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις.
>
> Since to be pleased consists in perceiving a certain emotion and since imagination [*phantasia*] is a kind of weak perception and since some kind of imagination of what a person remembers or hopes is likely to remain in his memory and hopes—if this is the case, it is clear that pleasures come simultaneously to those who are remembering and hoping, since there is perception there, too. (Kennedy ad loc.)

This famous passage, with its αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, does not, of course, collapse the conceptual complexity of *phantasia* surveyed above into a facile equation between it and perception. The enclitic τις here, as often, signals a simplification; it warns us of an approximation that, while suitable to the context and argument at hand, yet lacks the philosophical sophistication and accuracy that might be necessary and present elsewhere.[76]

The connection between *phantasia* and *aisthêsis* is helped by the semantic range of αἰσθάνομαι, which—Aristotle teaches in *DA* II.6—covers not only *aisthêta* perceived in themselves, but also what might be called "incidental objects," perceived κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The former are proper, ἴδια, to one of the ordinary senses (e.g. seeing white or tasting sweetness); or common, τὰ κοινά, to all or some (e.g. size or number). The incidental, he illustrates as follows: "An object of perception is spoken of as incidental, e.g. if the white thing were the son of Diares; for you perceive this incidentally, since this which you perceive is incidental to the white thing. Hence too you are not affected by the object of perception as such" (418a20–24).[77] It is clear that percep-

[75] I follow Roemer's text, which reflects Susemihl's emendation. Alternatively, the κἄν of ΘΠΓΣ (using Ross's *sigla*) may actually be κἀν = καὶ ἐν (so Kassel, after Arnet), where the ἀεί required by the syllogism, though not explicit, is nevertheless understood to apply. In any case, it is clear that εἰ δὲ τοῦτο summarizes the three protases, and that δέ must therefore be resumptive. Cf. Grimaldi 1980: 251.

[76] Cf. Watson 1982: 103 n. 6 and Wedin 1988: 89. I am not hereby necessarily endorsing the widespread view of the *Rhetoric* as a treatise lacking in exactitude. For a survey of the literature for and against this view see Fortenbaugh 1974: 222 n. 4 and 223 n .5. Cf. also Striker 1996: 286–88.

[77] Hamlyn's 1968 translation ad loc. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ

tion of incidental objects is of a higher order, in that it calls for processing and integrating with memory an array of data (proper and common). And yet at one level—and certainly in popular parlance—we can still say that we "see the son of Diares" just as we might as well say that we "recognize" him: *seeing* considers it from the perspective of the senses, *recognizing*, from that of the mind. It is precisely this double-sidedness of perception that gives rise to the concept of an αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, and the discourse on *phantasia* seeks to understand the individual roles of soul and body and their mutual interplay when such "perception-as-realization" takes place. Only in this sense is it right to say that we feel an emotion: not as a bare affection, as a dog may be said to be angry—for emotion is not a sensory datum impinging on the senses—but by becoming aware of a *phantasma* that is, in turn, attended by pleasure or pain in their various forms.[78] This explains the words ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής: if *aisthêsis* is attended by pleasure or pain,[79] and memories and hopes—which involve *phantasmata* of the things one remembers or hopes for—are painful or pleasurable, then, on the point of analogy, *phantasia* is a sort of weak *aisthêsis*.[80]

συμβέβηκε τοῦτο, οὗ αἰσθάνεται· διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ᾗ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Note how πάσχειν and αἰσθητόν are connected, just as αἰσθάνεσθαι and πάθος. This is significant, of course, because of the connection of *pathos* to *lexis* and *hypokrisis*.

[78] *pathos* covers anything that comes about through πάσχειν (cf. *DELG* s.v. πάσχω). At *DA* 403a7, ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι are listed as πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς (for sweetness, cold, heat, etc. as πάθη, see *Cat.* 9b2–9). At 403a17–18 the list is: θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν; all these happen "with the body," the philosopher adds, "because together with these the body feels something" (ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα, 403a18–19). The concept of *pathos* extends further to states of mind and body such as sleep (*De Insomn.* 462a3–4: ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐν ᾧ ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ), to μνήμη, "memory" (*De Mem.* 449b4–6), and even to *phantasmata* (*De Mem.* 450a10–11: καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν [bracketed by Ross, after Freudenthal]).

[79] In ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους (1370a27–28) *pathos* stands broadly for τὸ πάσχειν τι (see above, n. 78). It might thus be rendered "affection"—not in the narrow sense of "emotion" (though emotions are certainly included) but the more general one of "the state of being influenced or acted upon." The connection of *aisthêsis* with *pathê* is natural, since sense organs must be *affected* by the corresponding stimuli for perception to occur (*DA* 424b25–26). But just as every sense has its corresponding pleasure (*EN* 1174b20–21), so also the emotions (*pathê* as *animi perturbationes*) are accompanied by pleasure and pain: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν ἰλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη (*EN* 1105b21–23).

[80] Cf. Wedin 1988: 89. Of course, Aristotle's reasoning does not deduce, but assumes as a premise, what we have presented as the conclusion; his goal is to argue that memory and hope are, in fact, attended by pleasure and pain (cf. *Rh.* 1370a30–32).

The other instances of *phantasia* in the *Rhetoric* follow the established norm; as Grimaldi (1980: 256) notes, through "imagination, the presentative faculty," *phantasmata* affect our appetitive system.[81] Indeed, at 1370b33 victory is said to give rise to a *phantasia* of superiority (ὑπεροχή), "which all strongly or mildly desire"; at 1371a9 honor and a good reputation are reckoned among the most pleasurable possessions, because on their account each has the *phantasia* "that he is such as a worthy man (ὁ σπουδαῖος), all the more when they say so who he thinks speak truly"; at 1371a19, elaborating on why being loved is pleasant, the reason offered is that "there too [the one loved enjoys] a *phantasia* that being good is his nature, [a thing] which all who perceive it desire"; at 1378b10, the *phantasia* is "dwelling upon the thought of revenge"; and at 1382a21, 1383a17, and 1384a22 the word enters into the respective definitions of fear and courage (which involve a future expectation—the *elpis* noted at 1370a29—of evil or safety) and shame ("a *phantasia* of loss of honor"). In none of these instances is the emphasis on the unreality of what is "presented" to the mind;[82] the focus is rather on the cognitive process that consists in entertaining a given notion or idea, a process that brings pleasure or pain to the one who engages in it. The point of view taken is *doxa*,[83] often that of a third-party, and there is a keen interest in how our notions are affected by those around us. In one case we even read explicitly that the *phantasma* is what others *say* about us; and that the persuasion operative in the *phantasia* is enhanced in proportion as the speakers are trustworthy—an argument that points the way to the "scientific" (ἔντεχνον)

[81] For Fortenbaugh's 2002 view of *phantasia* as it concerns the emotions and my disagreement with it, see above, pp. 100 and 115.

[82] Concerning 1384a22, Kennedy 1991: 146 n.56 notes: "As usual, this means a mental 'visualization' of the effects, not (as the English word may imply) a false conclusion."

[83] Labarrière 1984 argues for an understanding of *logos* that puts the accent on *oratio* rather than *ratio*. While animals do not have reason, he says, they are not entirely deprived of rationality: τὸ αἰσθητικόν—which animals obviously have—cannot be easily classified as either *alogon* or λόγον ἔχον (*DA* 432a30–31); besides, many (if not most) animals have *phantasia* and *mnêmê* of particulars (*EN* 1147b5); and, as a survey readily shows (cf. *ibid.* pp. 34–40), Aristotle assigns to some a kind of *mathêsis* and *didaskalia*, and to birds, ἑρμηνεία ἀλλήλοις and even a διάλεκτος. Moreover, following *GA* 786b23–25 and *DA* 420b29–33, Labarrière links *phônê*—a *sêmeion* of pain and pleasure (*Pol.* 1253a10–11)—to αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία. The implication is that the opposition between αἰσθητική and λογιστικὴ φαντασία reflects the one between *phônê* and *logos*; and hence, the *logos* in question is not so much *ratio* as *oratio*. Whether one agrees with him or no, one can hardly deny that, at the very least, wherever *ratio* is involved, persuasion is active as "l'espace intersubjectif et dialogal de l'opinion et de la délibération" (32), a space that turns readily into the public sphere of *doxa* where the community engages in dialog and persuasion.

study of reasoned emotional appeal, an appeal that, insofar as it is based on *logos*, has a legitimate place in the art of rhetoric.[84]

DA 433a10–22 calls *phantasia* a kind of thinking: as *doxa*, it is a critical faculty (even if not a *full*, i.e., independent, one); but, significantly, in contrast to *doxa*, it does not necessarily carry *pistis* (*DA* 428a20–24)—arguably the ultimate goal of rhetoric. This fundamental distinction is one that we must bear in mind as we think of the oratorical task: *phantasia*, the very system of [re]presentation for the διανοητικὴ ψυχή, is the means by which the speaker shapes the perception of his audience. Such molding influence works at all the available cognitive levels (including the *pisteis* inherent in the αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, just as even the geometer must use *phantasmata*), but it pertains especially to *pathos*, as the orator endeavors to secure a desirable outcome or avoid a disagreeable one. Even a speaker's successful self-presentation, which turns on his ability to communicate proper *êthos*, can be reinterpreted as *phantasia* towards the hearers with a view to creating such *pathê* as will move them to act to the speaker's advantage.[85] And *lexis*, of course, studies which use of *logos*—including, we must always remember, *phônê* and its attributes—best conveys the orator's meaning, best achieves his goals, evoking such *phantasmata* as will support his case. Thus, he will adopt an "angry style" when dealing with insolence, an "indignant" and "reticent" when handling impious and shameful matters; he will speak with admiration of what is worthy of praise,

[84] Cf. Brinton 1988.

[85] That such overlap between *êthos* and *pathos* exists is generally denied by Fortenbaugh, who in a series of works (see Fortenbaugh, 1996, *passim*, esp. 147, with bibliography in nn. 3–4) has argued that persuasion through character is not intended to arouse emotion in the audience and does not compromise the objectivity of the juror. (His only concession is that at *Rh.* II.1 *eunoia* is thought of as an emotion, not of the audience but *of the speaker*; but cf. *Rh.* 1415a35–36, where it is paired with ὀργίσαι.) By insisting on the distinction Aristotle draws between *eunoia* and *philia* in *EN* 1166b30–35, he seems to imply, e.g., that should the audience see the orator manifest intense *philia* towards them (or their city), they would be inclined to mistrust him; or else that the speaker should seek to restrain such feelings for fear of warping his own or his hearers' judgment (Fortenbaugh 1996: 164). Neither implication squares with intuition or actual practice. (Of course, if such protestations were overdone, they may look inauthentic and fail to convince, but this is entirely another matter.) And even if the distinction of *EN* holds, many an Athenian orator must have boasted strong affection for his city and convinced her of the honesty of his claims, or else the parody in Aristophanes' *Knights* would ring hollow (cf., e.g., 732, 773, and 1339–55). Far better, then, to acknowledge with Carey 1994: 35 that, "[i]n practice, *ethos* and *pathos* are closely connected, for one of the effects of *ethos*, as well as inducing a degree of trust, is also to produce a feeling of goodwill in the audience toward the speaker." (Cf. *ibid.* 39 and 43, and Russell 1990: 205–6 and 212.) In other words: the orator succeeds when his *eunoia* and *philia* are reciprocated by his audience.

and humbly of pitiable things (*Rh.* 1408a16–19). All these, being matters of style and delivery, will imply an appropriate register for the orator's voice—a careful choice of intonation, loudness, and prose rhythm—and a fitting countenance that does not raise the suspicion of speciousness (1408b4–7). These are all visual and aural *phantasmata* that render style effective in expressing *êthos* and *pathos* (1408a10–11), and whose goal is a "community of feeling" between hearer and speaker that creates plausibility and persuasion: "The proper *lexis* also makes the matter credible: the mind [of the listener] draws a false inference of the truth of what a speaker says because they [in the audience] feel the same about such things, so they think the facts to be so, even if they are not as the speaker represents them; and the hearer suffers along with the pathetic speaker, even if what he says amounts to nothing" (1408a19–24).[86] Thus conceived, rhetorical performance, deliberate in its *lexis* and *hypokrisis*, seeks to bring the audience under the spell of the orator: through carefully designed sensory *phantasmata*—including voice, gestures, and all the resources of style—he attempts to place before his listeners a particular [re]presentation of the facts; this [re]presentation, successfully brought before his mind's eye, becomes the hearer's own *phantasia* (the sensory *phantasmata* now having noetic status). The orator's design and hope is that the audience will feel the force of his *phantasia*—its *pistis*—and will embrace his [re]presentation as their own *doxa*. Thus, *phantasia* not only denotes the soul's [re]presentational faculty: it may also be used interchangeably with *phantasmata* or even stand for the oratorical technique that manipulates them for rhetorical ends. This technique, Aristotle tells us, works best when the orator turns his own *phantasia*—his own internal [re]presentations—into sensory *phantasmata* of adequate *lexis* and *skhêmata* that foster and give expression to his own emotions. Then is his *pathos* best able to stir the equivalent feelings in his listeners and to excite in them a corresponding *phantasia* that becomes instrumental to the art of persuasion.[87]

Aristotle's treatment, his specific guidance to the would-be orator in crafting *phantasmata*, is compressed and, by later standards, relatively undeveloped.

[86] Kennedy ad loc. The concessive clauses εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ⟨λέγει⟩ ὁ λέγων and κἂν μηθὲν λέγῃ do not condone, much less enjoin, deception or encourage emotional appeals ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. They only state the obvious: that rhetoric, as any other social endeavor, is open to the manipulation of deceit, all the more so inasmuch as its potential impact is great.

[87] This is elaborated in connection with the poet's art in *Poetics* 17, 1455a22–32. There, the *lexis* of τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι goes beyond mere "verbal expression" to include the rhetorical qualities of propriety (the presence of τὸ πρέπον and the absence of τὰ ὑπεναντία, 1455a25–26) and vividness (ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον, 1455a23). On this passage see Meijering 1987: 14–17.

But he is seminal in opening the way to later scholars: "Since sufferings are pitiable when they appear near at hand…necessarily those [people] are more pitiable who contribute to the effect by gestures and cries and display of feeling and generally by their acting [*hypokrisis*]" (Kennedy *ad* 1386a29–33).[88] By placing the evil before the mind's eye (πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες), speakers make it appear close (ἐγγὺς ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι)[89] and evoke the corresponding *pathos*. The orator's *phantasmata* are not like the ones the mind entertains on account of the facts themselves; they are rhetorically constructed by the application of *lexis* to *êthos* and *pathos*, and can be deconstructed by one's opponent: their force is not that of logical inevitability. And this, I believe, is the note of caution Aristotle strikes when he says that *lexis*, insofar as it is *phantasia* towards the hearers, can only be of limited import.[90] The philosopher's comment, then, is not a dismissive aside, but offers a realistic estimate of the promise of *lexis* and its corresponding limitations.

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[88] ἐπεὶ δ' ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινά ἐστιν...ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ αἰσθήσει καὶ ὅλως ἐν ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι. This passage of the *Rhetoric* is similar in sentiment to the beginning of *Poetics* 17, on which see above, n. 87. Cf. Dupont-Roc and Lallot 1980: 281–84.

[89] *Rh.* 1386a33–34.

[90] This may be said to apply by implication even to *rhêtorikê* as a whole, because its ultimate orientation is πρὸς δόξαν, i.e., its goal is to shape opinion. In view of the arguments presented in this paper, I suggest the following translation of *Rh.* 1404a8–11: "Nevertheless, the subject of *lexis* has some small necessary place in every demonstrative discipline, for speaking this way or that makes some difference to getting across clearly; yet not so great [a difference]—its importance should not be overstated—but all this is a matter of how things will appear to the listener."

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